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Abstract
There has been an increase in research into the security culture in organizations in 
recent years. This growing interest has been accompanied by the development of 
tools to measure the level of security culture in order to identify potential threats 
and formulate solutions. This article provides a systematic overview of the existing 
tools. A total of 16 are identified, of which six are studied in detail. This explo-
ration reveals that there is no validated and widely accepted tool that can be used 
in different sectors and organizations. The majority of the tools reviewed use only 
a quantitative method; however, security culture includes very different domains 
and therefore a mixed-method approach should be used. In contrast to security cul-
ture, instruments for measuring safety culture are widely available, and with many 
similarities between these two domains it is possible that well-established tools for 
measuring safety culture could be adapted to a security environment.
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Introduction
Prior to 2001 organizations generally paid little or no attention to security threats. 
However, the terrorist attacks on 9/11 instigated a shift, and the issue of security 
was suddenly much more important (Baybut and Ready 2003). Many business 
leaders focused on implementing new security technology, and paid less attention 
to the broader ‘security culture’ of their organization (Chia et al. 2003). However, 
the increased interest in security within organizations encouraged researchers to 
study this topic more in depth. They realized that an organization’s security cul-
ture might play an important role in maintaining an adequate level of security in 
an organization (Andress and Fonseca 2000; Beynon 2001; Breidenbach 2000; 
Schwarzwalder 1999; von Solms 2000). For instance, Connolly (2000) argues 
that a strong security culture is needed to convince employees that security is an 
important issue, as it impacts the likelihood of a malicious attack. Vierendeels 
et al. (2018) believe that the success of security measures is related to the secu-
rity culture of organizations. According to Da Veiga and Martins (2015), a strong 
security culture enables members of an organization to behave in a more secure 
way in order to reduce security incidents.
Despite substantial interest in the subject, researchers struggle to agree on 
what factors or constructs constitute a security culture, and how it can be estab-
lished (Alnatheer et al. 2012; Schlienger and Teufel 2003). A number of authors 
suggest that a security culture must be regularly modified to ensure that it con-
stantly corresponds with the goals of an organization (Kruger and Kearney 2006; 
Martins and Eloff 2002; Schlienger and Teufel 2003). They emphasize the impor-
tance of repeated measurement in order to propose recommendations that estab-
lish, improve, and maintain a strong security culture (Chia et al. 2003). Unfortu-
nately, very little research has been carried out into how organizational security 
culture should be evaluated (Chia et  al. 2003), and only a few measuring tools 
have been created worldwide (Schlienger and Teufel 2005).
Effective tools for measuring organizational security culture enable busi-
nesses to uncover critical issues and risk areas, formulate recommendations, and 
implement improvements over time. Therefore, an overview of the tools that are 
currently available could provide useful insights for practitioners and highlight 
areas for further research (Chia et al. 2003). While van Nunen et al. (2018a) have 
explored the tools used and developed in Belgian organizations to measure safety 
culture, an overview of the existing instruments that measure security culture 
is lacking. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to provide a systematic overview 
of the science-based instruments that are used to assess security culture within 
organizations worldwide. Below, we first give an overview of the state-of-the-art 
insights into security culture. We then provide information about the methodo-
logical approach of our systematic review, followed by a comparison of the char-
acteristics of the measuring tools that have been reviewed. Finally, we discuss the 
findings and provide recommendations for organizations and future research.
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Security culture
Lundy and Cowling (1996) argue that security culture can be seen as a subculture 
of the organizational culture. The latter can, in simplest terms, be described as 
“the way things are done in an organization”. According to Schein (2009, p. 27), 
organizational culture is “a pattern of shared tacit assumptions that is learned by 
a group”. When developed well, this can solve internal and external organiza-
tional problems. Nosworthy (2000) argues that organizational culture has a strong 
impact on security culture. A first definition of security culture was formulated 
within the domain of information security by Schlienger and Teufel (2003, p. 
405), who stated that security culture is “all socio-cultural measures that support 
technical security measures”. Malcolmson (2009, p. 361) presented a more exten-
sive definition, arguing that “security culture is indicated in the assumptions, val-
ues, attitudes and beliefs, held by members of an organization, and behaviors they 
perform”. Importantly, security culture should not be confused with the security 
climate, which refers to employees’ shared perceptions about the organization’s 
security policy. The security climate should therefore be seen as a part of the 
whole security culture of a company (Vierendeels et al. 2018).
A distinction can be made between information security, such as the protection 
of computer networks and the data therein, and physical security, such as the pro-
tection of infrastructure and employees. According to van Niekerk and von Solms 
(2005), who based their ideas on Schein’s (2004) model of organizational culture, 
information security culture consists of four levels: (1) artifacts, (2) espoused val-
ues, (3) shared tacit assumptions, and (4) information security knowledge. The 
artifacts reflect the visible and measurable security aspects in an organization, 
such as the behavior of employees, security handbooks, or technology. Espoused 
values are a partially visible layer of security culture, such as the goals, strate-
gies, or documents that describe the principles and values of the company. The 
shared tacit assumptions form the core of the organization’s culture when the val-
ues and beliefs of the organization become shared. The fourth level, information 
security knowledge, supports the other three levels. According to the authors, in 
order to create a strong security culture, employees need to have enough security 
knowledge, they need to know the security needs of the organization, and they 
need to be aware of why security measures have been taken (van Niekerk and 
von Solms 2005). Other researchers (Schlienger and Teufel 2005; Vroom and von 
Solms 2004; Zakaria 2004) also link their model of security culture to Schein’s 
(2004) organizational model and identify similar aspects of information security 
culture.
Focusing on physical security culture in chemical plants, Reniers and Dullaert 
(2007) identify three crucial domains: people, procedures, and technology. They 
argue that the people domain comprises individuals’ ideas about the organiza-
tion’s security and the way they handle security. The procedures domain refers 
to the measures that are implemented to safeguard the security of the organiza-
tion. Finally, the technology domain comprises the technical devices used to pro-
tect company from criminal acts. Starting from the same theoretical foundation 
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as Reniers and Dullaert (2007), a more elaborate description of physical secu-
rity culture is proposed by van Nunen et al. (2018b), who focus on the similar-
ity between aspects of a safety culture presented in The Egg Aggregated Model 
(TEAM) (Vierendeels et  al. 2018). According to the authors, both safety and 
security culture can be separated into three domains: technological, organiza-
tional, and human (see Fig.  1). Focusing on security culture, the technological 
domain consists of aspects such as the security technology, equipment, and mate-
rial of the organization. The organizational domain comprises the security policy, 
the resources available for security, and the security management. Finally, the 
human domain contains aspects such as security knowledge, attitudes, priorities, 
decisions, and the behavior of employees. Van Nunen et al. (2018b) argue that the 
organizational and human domains are manifested at two levels. At the first level 
are the observable security aspects that are noticeable when walking around the 
company. The second level consists of the non-observable, or not immediately 
apparent, aspects of security that can still be measured. In contrast to the organi-
zational and human domain, the technological domain comprises only observable 
aspects of security.
In addition to the aspects related to the characteristics of the organization, 
the influence of external factors is emphasized. Factors such as the socio-eco-
nomic status, level of technological development, or regulations and legisla-
tion of the country or region where the organization is based affect its secu-
rity culture. Security culture is also determined by the security threats, such as 
theft, terrorism, or espionage, that an organization is exposed to. Organizations’ 
Fig. 1  An integrative conceptual framework for physical security culture in organizations (van Nunen 
et al. 2018b)
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vulnerability to these threats differs depending on the company’s characteristics. 
For instance, nuclear companies are more vulnerable to terrorism or activism, 
whereas in the financial sector security threats such as fraud or theft are more 
prominent.
When measuring security culture, van Nunen et  al. (2018a) recommend a 
multi-method approach in order to take into account the technological, organi-
zational, and human aspects. The authors argue that quantitative methods such 
as questionnaires are needed to measure the non-observable domains of security 
culture, for instance the security knowledge of employees. Qualitative tools such 
as observations, interviews, or focus groups are required to measure the observ-
able security domains, for instance the written security procedures. Qualitative 
methods can also provide a broader view of the non-observable aspects, such as 
the management’s security priorities. Alvesson and Berg (1992) point out that 
qualitative and quantitative methods have both weaknesses and strengths, and 
therefore a mixed-method approach should be used to measure the security cul-
ture in depth. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (2017) agrees, 
and states that a triangulated approach is needed to gather data from multiple 
points of reference. For instance, surveys could be followed by interviews to clar-
ify ambiguities and fill in possible gaps.
Despite researchers’ increased interest in security culture, there is no widely 
accepted or validated tool available for measuring security culture within differ-
ent kinds of organization. However, a few researchers have developed tools that 
measure culture within a specific security domain. As part of this study, in order 
to get a clear view of the different approaches, a systematic overview was con-
ducted. It was hoped that identifying the characteristics of current measuring 
tools would enable researchers and organizations to gain more insight in order to 
develop a standardized and validated instrument. The methodological approach 
used for the systematic overview is presented below.
Methodology
Search strategy
Two online databases, Google Scholar and Web of Science, were searched for 
measuring tools. The following keywords were used: [instrument OR survey OR 
measuring tool OR assessment OR questionnaire] AND [security OR security 
culture OR security behavior OR security climate]. In addition, other relevant 
studies were retrieved by manually screening the references of all the full-text 
articles that were included in the study. When necessary details about a measur-
ing tool were missing in the article or related studies, the developer of the tool 
was contacted via email in order to gather more information. No limits were put 
on where or when studies were conducted. However, as research on security cul-
ture is still at an early stage, only studies between 2000 and 2019 were found and 
selected.
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Inclusion criteria
Studies were selected for inclusion by reviewing each article for its relevance and 
content. The inclusion process was based on five criteria:
(1) A focus on security culture: Because numerous researchers argue that security 
awareness should be seen as only a part of the security culture (Alnatheer et al. 
2012; van Niekerk and von Solms 2005), studies from authors who indicate that 
they only focus on security awareness among employees of an organization were 
excluded from the review.
(2) Original tool: Only articles that contain a description of a tool by its original 
developers are included in the review. Studies containing information about a 
tool developed by someone other than the article authors were excluded. In such 
cases, the original tools were checked for their relevance to this study.
(3) Sufficient information about the content of the instrument: The article must con-
tain sufficient, and detailed, information about the content and application of the 
measuring tool, to enable this study to provide a comprehensive overview of the 
different options. Articles that contain only limited details, even after contacting 
the author, were excluded.
(4) Possible applications of the tool: Because this article aims to give an overview 
of the existing tools within very different security domains, it is important that 
a specific comparison is possible. For instance, Maidabino and Zainab (2011) 
developed a tool that can only be used to measure the security culture in librar-
ies, so its application possibilities are limited to one specific sector. Only studies 
that provide a tool with more or less generalizable content were included.
(5) Practical approach: In order to understand how the tool can be used in prac-
tice, only articles that contain a clear description of the application process are 
included. Solely theoretical approaches were excluded.
Results of the search
In total, 12 tools were retrieved during the search using the keywords, while four 
other relevant studies were retrieved by manually screening the references of all the 
full-text articles included in the overview (see Fig. 2). Application of the inclusion 
Fig. 2  Results of the search for security culture measuring tools
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criteria resulted in a number of exclusions. Four tools were excluded because of 
their narrow focus on security awareness instead of security culture (criterion 1). 
One tool was excluded because the tool had been created by someone other than the 
article authors (criterion 2). Two tools were excluded because of a lack of sufficient 
information about the content of the instrument (criterion 3). One tool was excluded 
because the tool could not be generalized to other situations (criterion 4). Two tools 
were excluded because they were solely theoretical (criterion 5). In the end, six tools 
were eligible for inclusion in the systematic overview.
Information collected per tool
Table 1 provides an overview of the general characteristics of the reviewed tools. 
Firstly, the domain the instrument was developed for is specified. Next, the key 
indicators of each tool are listed; this shows which aspects of a security culture the 
developers of the tool have prioritized. Details about the theoretical foundation of 
the tool are included, followed by the main objectives of the instrument.
In order to understand the practical application of the tool, the methodological 
strengths and limitations of its reliability and validity are presented. The table speci-
fies whether a multi-method approach was applied and, when a questionnaire was 
used, the type of survey, number of items, type of answers and target population. 
For tools that required a qualitative approach, the target population of the interviews 
or observations is included. These methodological characteristics are presented in 
Table 2.
Results
General characteristics of the tools
Based on the systematic overview, it is clear that the tools only focus on two security 
domains. Four of the six included instruments were specifically developed to meas-
ure information security culture within organizations, while the other two measure 
physical security culture. The information security domain has a predominant posi-
tion within research on security culture; as organizations rely ever more heavily on 
technology to run their businesses, so interest in information security has rapidly 
increased (Kruger and Kearney 2006).
A more detailed analysis of the measuring tools shows that the authors emphasize 
similar aspects of the security culture within organizations. Based on the TEAM 
model of Vierendeels et al. (2018), security culture consists of both observable and 
non-observable security domains. A comparison of the tools’ key indicators shows 
that they all aim to measure the non-observable security domain, which includes the 
security climate or shared security perceptions and individuals’ views on security. 
For instance, Alnatheer et al. (2012) focus on the security climate by measuring top 
management involvement in information security and who is responsible for secu-
rity. Schlienger and Teufel (2003) include the company’s perceptions of security as 
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a key indicator in order to assess shared security perceptions. To measure individu-
als’ mindsets on security issues, IAEA (2017) focuses on employees’ beliefs and 
attitudes, while WINS (2011) included employees’ beliefs, principles, and values as 
a key indicator.
The security culture also consists of an observable domain, which includes 
organizational, human, and technological security aspects (Vierendeels et al. 2018). 
The overview revealed that all instruments aim to measure organizational security 
aspects. Martins and Eloff (2002) include the organizational security policy and 
budget as key indicators, while AlHogail and Mirza (2015) focus on the security 
policies, guidelines, and best practices with their key indicator strategy. Subse-
quently, each tool focuses on human aspects or the security behavior of employees. 
For instance, IAEA (2017) measures personnel behavior and Schlienger and Teufel 
(2003) include the indicator artifacts which also include the behavior of employees. 
In contrast to the organizational and human domains, only half of the tools included 
key indicators to measure technological security measures. While Martins and Eloff 
(2002), AlHogail and Mirza (2015), and Schlienger and Teufel (2003) explicitly 
mention that they measure the technological security aspects of the organization, 
Alnatheer et al. (2012), IAEA (2017) and WINS (2011) do not focus on any tech-
nological aspects. Although IAEA (2017) indicates that the human and organiza-
tion aspects are inextricably linked to the technological measures, the tool does not 
assess the technological aspects. Finally, only AlHogail and Mirza (2015) focus on 
the impact of external security aspects, such as national culture, laws, and regula-
tions on the security culture of the organization, while other tools only focus on 
internal security aspects.
The majority of the instruments are based on a theoretical concept. For instance, 
both Schlienger and Teufel (2003) and the IAEA (2017) created their tool based 
on the model of organizational culture developed by Schein (2004). Martins and 
Eloff (2002) use the framework of Da Veiga and Eloff (2007) as a foundation for 
their instrument. Only Alnatheer et al. (2012) and WINS (2011) combine theoreti-
cal insights with experiences and expertise from practitioners in the development of 
their tool.
Finally, when analyzing the main objectives of the measuring instruments, it 
becomes clear that only half focus explicitly on improving the security culture by 
formulating specific recommendations. For instance, WINS (2011) and Martins and 
Eloff (2002) state that goal of their measuring process is the formulation of well-
founded recommendations. In contrast, IAEA (2017) and Alnatheer et  al. (2012) 
emphasize the measuring process without making specific recommendations based 
on the results.
Methodological characteristics of the tools
Only Schlienger and Teufel (2003) and IAEA (2017) make use of a multi-method 
approach to assess security culture, with the other tools only including a question-
naire. When analyzing the methodological strengths and limitations of the reliability 
and validity of the tools, the use of a multi-method approach can be seen as a strength. 
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Although questionnaires can be used to measure the security climate of an organiza-
tion, qualitative methods are vital to obtain a clear picture of the whole security cul-
ture. For instance, our comparison of the tools’ key indicators showed that they all 
emphasize employee behavior. However, depending on the methodological approach 
used, different forms of behavior will be measured. When the instrument only includes 
a quantitative approach, such as a survey, the focus is on self-reported behavior. When 
qualitative methods such as observations are used, the actual behavior of individuals 
can be observed and measured. While it can be very time-consuming and difficult to 
observe behavior in various situations, a combination of two methods would provide a 
more global view of individuals’ security behavior. For instance, Schlienger and Teufel 
(2003) conduct unstructured interviews with the chief security officer of an organiza-
tion, and IAEA (2017) proposes a semi-structured approach that includes staff mem-
bers from the entire organization. Both use document analysis to obtain an overview of 
the organization’s security policy and carry out audits to verify the answers provided 
by respondents, and to get a deeper insight into their actual behavior. Although IAEA 
(2017) emphasizes the importance of formal guidelines when carrying out the inter-
views, document analysis, and observations, Schlienger and Teufel (2003) did not use 
any formal guidelines when conducting these qualitative methods. Unfortunately, this 
makes it very difficult to repeat the exact same approach in other settings or by other 
researchers.
According to the articles’ authors, most of the tools show good results on reliabil-
ity and validity. Although the tools already contain numerous strengths, the develop-
ers themselves indicate that some adjustments still have to be made in order to fully 
develop them. For instance, Alnatheer et al. (2012) developed a tool for measuring the 
information security culture in Saudi Arabian companies, and it is not clear whether the 
tool could be used in other countries. The authors indicate that the business environ-
ment of Saudi Arabia is different from that of Western countries. While Saudi Arabian 
information technology companies are still developing, most international information 
security standards are written from the perspective of more technologically advanced 
Western countries. The different technological levels combined with the cultural differ-
ences between Western countries and Saudi Arabia cause challenges when implement-
ing the same measuring tool in both contexts.
When a questionnaire is included in these measuring tools, it is always as a self-
assessment. The number of items varies between 19 and 79. Alnatheer et al. (2012) 
have developed the shortest questionnaire (19 items), while AlHogail and Mirza (2015) 
have expanded their survey to 79 items. Five of the six questionnaires utilize a Lik-
ert scale. Only Schlienger and Teufel (2003) use a categorical answering scale with 
the options ‘True,’ ‘False,’ or ‘I don’t know.’ Employees from different job levels are 
included in the research samples. For instance, WINS (2011) gathers data from staff at 
all levels, including the board of directors.
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Conclusion and discussion
This article identified and analyzed tools that measure organizational security 
culture. Six tools were eligible for inclusion in the systematic overview. It was 
found that the tools focus on two security domains, namely information security 
and physical security. The tools were compared based on their general character-
istics and methodological approach. While they all included similar key indica-
tors, notable differences were found in their methodology.
As has already been mentioned, a common view on or widely accepted theo-
retical approach to security is lacking. While some researchers and practitioners 
do get involved in the debate about security culture, their attention is focused 
on certain security domains (e.g., information security) and sectors (e.g., nuclear 
companies). Indisputably, in scientific research, information security culture 
holds a dominant position. Despite the actual threats related to information secu-
rity, the vulnerability of organizations to other threats, such as terrorism, cannot 
be underestimated. For companies to prevent and be prepared for threats related 
to security, more research about physical security culture is needed.
Additionally, there is no widely accepted and consolidated approach or unique 
toolset available that can be used in different sectors or by different organizations 
(Schlienger and Teufel 2003). Therefore, a standardized measuring tool needs to 
be developed. Collaboration between researchers and practitioners is required in 
order to create a strong, practical-based instrument that can be validated in sci-
entific research. By adjusting the tool to the characteristics of the company in the 
preparation phase of the measuring process, a standardized instrument could be 
used by different organizations and sectors. As the overview showed that tools 
that only measure information security or physical security contain similar key 
indicators, an instrument that combines these two security domains could read-
ily be developed. Most importantly, a tool must be adaptable to an organization’s 
specific characteristics. For instance, different organizations are more or less 
exposed to security threats, so this should be taken into account in the developing 
process. This means that a one-size-fits-all approach must be avoided. Addition-
ally, there are some benefits for benchmarking when different organizations use 
the same instrument and the results can be compared. The insights obtained by a 
company comparing its results to those of a similar one can enable it to improve 
its security culture.
In creating a standardized instrument, much can be learned from adapting the 
knowledge about safety culture to the measurement of security culture. In con-
trast to the limited number of tools that are currently available to measure secu-
rity culture, several tools already exist to measure safety culture. While safety and 
security were long seen as independent of each other, more recent research shows 
that there are a lot of similarities between these domains (Kria et al. 2015; van 
Nunen et al. 2018b). Both domains focus on the prevention of undesirable events, 
such as injuries to people, and material or environmental damage. The main dif-
ference is in the origin of these events—damage is unintentional in the field of 
safety and intentional in the case of a security incident. Additionally, there is a 
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difference between risks related to the domain of safety and threats in the field of 
security. As safety risks are mostly rooted inside the organization and therefore 
are well known, security threats are predominantly rooted outside of the organi-
zation and are more difficult to uncover. The greatest similarity is that both safety 
and security are part of the overall culture of the organization. This implies that 
a focus on the technological, organizational, and human aspects in both fields is 
needed to ensure an integrated and strong organizational culture (van Nunen et al. 
2018b). Therefore, it can be useful to consider to what extent the existing tools 
for measuring safety culture can be applied to the security context. Adjustments 
or additions could be made to preexisting tools by altering the aspects included in 
the tool to the different aspects of a security culture. This process would result in 
the creation of a measuring tool for security culture based on an already existing 
framework developed for measuring safety culture.
Recommendations
Based on the systematic review, some recommendations can be made about creating 
an effective tool for assessing the security culture within an organization.
Firstly, a multi-method approach should be used, as it provides a more detailed 
picture of the security culture of an organization. All tools in the systematic review 
used a quantitative approach, while only two add qualitative methods. Due to their 
statistical robustness, questionnaires can be included without major costs (Da Veiga 
2008). Additionally, completing the survey could create more security awareness 
among employees. On the other hand, as there is no certainty as to how respondents 
interpret the specific questions, the reliability of this method remains uncertain. In 
contrast, qualitative methods have the benefit of revealing more detailed insights in 
the results (Kaplan and Duchon 1988), but also have their limits, especially in terms 
of generalizability and time (Alvesson and Berg 1992). Considering both the weak-
nesses and strengths of qualitative and quantitative methods, it is believed that a 
multi-method approach is needed to measure security culture (Alvesson and Berg 
1992). As the results of one method can be verified with those of other approaches, 
there are greater opportunities for data analysis (Schlienger and Teufel 2005). Addi-
tionally, the researcher is able to explore different points of view when interpret-
ing the results (Fleeger 1993). Considering the very different domains of a secu-
rity culture, it is recommended that both quantitative and qualitative methods be 
used. For instance, while data about the observable security aspects can be gathered 
through qualitative methods such as interviews, focus groups, document analyses, or 
observations, a quantitative approach is needed to explore employees’ perceptions 
of security issues (van Nunen et al. 2018b). The multi-method approach makes the 
measuring process more time-intensive, but ensures a more detailed and realistic 
result that can be translated into substantiated recommendations for the organiza-
tion. As culture has a very comprehensive structure, it is impossible to measure it 
well in a short period of time.
Secondly, it is recommended that the entire organization should be involved in 
the measuring process. Numerous authors argue that the involvement of both staff 
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and top management is necessary to measure and improve a security culture (Chia 
et al. 2003; Da Veiga and Eloff 2007; Kraemer et al. 2009; Schlienger and Teufel 
2003). As cultural change in an organization should always start with the support 
of top management, a strong security culture can only be created and maintained 
with the consistent involvement and support of those at the top of the organization 
(Alnatheer et al. 2012; O’Donovan 2006). Ownership of and commitment to secu-
rity by both management and employees is necessary for them to understand their 
role in the security policy and to be convinced that security is important (Connolly 
2000).
Thirdly, external security threats should be included in the measuring process, in 
addition to internal security aspects. Organizations are always more or less exposed 
to certain external security threats, such as theft or fraud, depending on the compa-
ny’s characteristics. It is important that these ‘standard’ threats are considered when 
developing a measuring instrument. In addition, the external aspects or the general 
characteristics of the country or region where the company is based also have an 
influence on the security culture of an organization. For instance, national culture, 
socio-economic or technological development, and legislation could all have a sub-
stantial impact (van Nunen et  al. 2018b). Therefore, as organizations are always 
exposed to these security threats and external factors, it is important to take them 
into account when measuring security culture.
Finally, the formulation and implementation of well-founded recommendations 
and systematic follow-ups are required to achieve a strong security culture. This 
review found that only two tools explicitly mention possible improvements to the 
security culture of the organization. Other tools were still being developed and 
therefore only their methodology could be reviewed. However, all authors focus on 
identifying weaknesses and strengths in the field of security, so it is highly recom-
mended that those results are used when formulating recommendations. Assessing 
the security culture helps an organization to discover its strengths and weaknesses in 
order to make the right strategic choices (Ross 2011; Schein 2009). Also, the results 
of regular assessments can show whether recommendations from previous measure-
ments were actually implemented, and the extent to which these measures effectively 
improved the security culture of an organization (Martins and Eloff 2002). If newly 
implemented measures are found to be inefficient, there may be some shortcomings 
with the measuring tool. Therefore, it is important that tools contain easily applica-
ble criteria to translate measurement results into well-founded recommendations for 
an organization. Only in this way can security culture be improved and maintained.
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